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Abstract:  This book chapter describes the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the 
ongoing financial crisis.  The chapter first explains the hybrid public-private nature of 
Fannie and Freddie, which are what is known as Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs).  Fannie and Freddie were originally chartered by the federal government to 
create a national mortgage market.  The chapter then explains how the two GSEs 
morphed into extraordinarily large companies that profited enormously from their special 
relationship with the federal government, while providing only modest benefits to 
American homeowners.  In what turned out to be a disastrous trade-off for American 
taxpayers, Fannie and Freddie ended up needing a bailout measured in the hundreds of 
billions of dollars.  Ultimately, Fannie and Freddie exhibited the common failings of poor 
GSE design—after fulfilling their original purpose, they took on monstrously large lives 
of their own that defied political oversight.  The chapter concludes that Fannie and 
Freddie should be privatized, with their remaining public functions assumed by pure 
government actors. 
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AND SOCIALIZING LOSS 
 
As part of its response to the ongoing credit crisis, in the fall of 2008 the federal 
government placed the Federal National Mortgage Association (typically referred to as 
“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association (typically referred to 
as “Freddie Mac”) in conservatorship.   While they are for-profit, privately owned 
mortgage finance companies whose shares trade on the New York Stock Exchange, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are also two of the few companies directly chartered by 
Congress, so called Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs).  The federal government 
has given them the mission of providing liquidity and stability to the United States 
residential mortgage market and achieving certain affordable housing goals.   
The privileges attendant to this special relationship with the federal government 
allowed Fannie and Freddie to pass on certain savings to American homeowners but also 
to extract monopoly profits in the American residential mortgage market.  Meanwhile, 
their hybrid public-private status enabled them to exert outsized political influence and 
drive much of the legislative and regulatory agenda regarding their own fates.  Thus 
while Freddie and Fannie’s early success made the U.S.’s secondary residential mortgage 
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market the envy of other nations for quite some time, the two companies took on 
monstrously large lives of their own that well surpassed their original purpose.  It would 
take the greatest financial crisis of our lifetime, and a bailout to be measured in the 
hundreds of billions of dollars, before Fannie and Freddie’s extraordinarily privileged 
status would be seriously challenged.  
Congress has a long history of relying upon GSEs to spur private investment.  
Indeed, the special privileges accorded a GSE are variants on the longstanding 
government practice of spurring private investment in various arenas by granting some 
privilege or monopoly power to a party that could infuse the activity with needed capital 
or bring focused attention to it.  For example, government-granted monopolies can take 
the form of a charter granting a monopoly on trade, such as the one granted by Queen 
Elizabeth I to the English East India Company in 1600 in order to increase English trade 
with Asian nations.  They can take the form of a system such as that governing American 
patents, granting patent-holders the sole right to exploit a patent for a certain period in 
order to encourage innovation.  Or they can take the form of a regulated natural 
monopoly, like a utility company, that is regulated not only to protect consumers from 
monopoly pricing but also to ensure that the company can make a fair return on its 
investment.   
 
Fannie and Freddie Create the Modern Secondary Mortgage Market  
Mortgages have always been bought and sold by investors, but until relatively 
recently, the secondary mortgage market has been an informal arrangement. The 
introduction of residential mortgage-backed securities in the 1970s changed that; once 
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mortgages are converted into residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), they can 
be easily traded on the secondary market with comparatively few transaction costs.  In 
the simplest terms, this is how it works:   
1. Borrowers get mortgages from lenders in the primary market; 
2. primary market lenders then sell these mortgages to secondary mortgage 
market firms and use the proceeds to originate more mortgages in the 
primary market; and 
3. the secondary mortgage market firms then sell securities backed by the 
mortgages that they purchased to investors and use the proceeds of the 
sale to purchase more mortgages from primary market lenders. 
In the late 1970s, RMBS securitization took off as traditional lenders could not 
keep up with the demand for home mortgages.  The most important factor in the 
development of the modern secondary mortgage market has been the creation of Fannie 
and Freddie.  While Fannie Mae had created a secondary market for government 
guaranteed and insured residential mortgage loans in the 1930s, the broad secondary 
market began in earnest with the chartering of Freddie Mac in 1970 and the decision to 
allow both GSEs to purchase and securitize conventional mortgages as well as 
government-insured or guaranteed mortgages.   
Unlike nearly every other financial institution in the 1970s, Fannie and Freddie’s 
businesses were not geographically restricted and they could develop a truly national 
market for mortgages.  As the dominant purchasers of residential mortgages, these GSEs 
have effectively standardized prime residential mortgages by promulgating buying 
guidelines.  Such standardization has led to an increase in the liquidity and attractiveness 
of mortgages as investments to a broad array of investors. 
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After Fannie and Freddie established the secondary mortgage market as a 
profitable enterprise, investment in RMBS exploded again as institutional investors 
entered the market.  Starting sporadically in the late 1970s, non-federal-related issuers, 
such as commercial banks and mortgage companies, began to issue RMBS.  These 
Aprivate label@ RMBS are issued without the type of guarantee that Fannie or Freddie 
would give, and they are typically backed by subprime and/or jumbo loans. 
 
The Foundation of the Fannie/Freddie Business Model is Their Regulatory Privilege 
Fannie and Freddie have two primary lines of business.  First, they help mortgage 
originators package their mortgages into RMBS by providing credit guarantees for those 
securities in return for a fee paid to the GSE.  The credit guarantees help maintain a stable 
and liquid market for RMBS.  Second, the two companies raise capital by issuing debt 
securities and use those funds to purchase mortgages and related securities.  Because of 
the privileges provided to them as government sponsored enterprises, Fannie and Freddie 
have been able to profit greatly from this second line of business. 
By statute, Fannie and Freddie’s operations are limited to the “conforming” sector 
of the mortgage market, which is made up of mortgages that do not exceed an annually 
adjusted threshold.  Loans that exceed the loan amount limit in a given year are known as 
“jumbo” loans.  Most of the remainder of the RMBS market belongs to Aprivate label@ 
firms which securitize (i) jumbo mortgages and (ii) subprime mortgages that Fannie and 
Freddie cannot or choose not to guarantee or purchase for their own portfolio. The two 
companies effectively have no competition in the conforming sector of the residential 
mortgage market because of advantages granted to them by the federal government in 
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their charters.  The most significant of these advantages has been the federal 
government’s implied (and, since their bailout, not-so-implied) guarantee of their debt 
obligations.  The guarantee allowed Fannie and Freddie to borrow funds more cheaply 
than its fully-private competitors.   They then can make money on the spread between 
their low cost of funds and what they must pay for the mortgage-related investments in 
their portfolios. 
 
Fannie and Freddie and the Credit Crisis 
Fannie and Freddie are extraordinarily large companies:  together, they own or 
guarantee more than forty percent of all the residential mortgages in the United States.  
As of early 2009, the two companies had a combined $5.36 trillion in mortgage-related 
obligations, which is of roughly the same magnitude as the $5.81 trillion of federal 
government debt held by the public at that time.  
As the two companies have grown immense, numerous commentators and 
government officials called for their reform. However, in combining elements of public 
instrumentalities and private companies, public-private hybrids like Fannie and Freddie 
can assert outsized influence in Washington.  Fannie and Freddie’s powerful lobbying 
forces have kept these reformers mostly at bay.   
As a result, Fannie and Freddie continued to grow at a rapid rate through the early 
2000s, until they were each hit by accounting scandals.  In response to those scandals, 
Congress and the two companies’ regulators began to take various steps to limit their 
growth.  But once they stabilized in 2007, the current credit crisis commenced and their 
market share began to increase once again as other lenders could not raise capital to lend 
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to borrowers.  Because of their government guarantee, Fannie and Freddie were thought 
to be well situated in a landscape where other lenders began to fail and the secondary 
market for subprime mortgages dried up.  Some prominent financial analysts suggested 
that Fannie and Freddie could easily ride out the turmoil in the mortgage markets.  Even 
more, some commentators were arguing that Fannie and Freddie would be able to bail out 
other mortgage market players by buying additional mortgages.    
As Fannie and Freddie’s star began to appear ascendant, troubling accounts of 
possible losses started to emerge:  their underwriting models had been too optimistic and 
had not accounted for the possibility of severe reductions in housing prices across the 
nation.  Further, the two industry giants had much more exposure to the problems in the 
toxic subprime and Alt-A portions of the mortgage market than they had let on in their 
public disclosures.   These fears were confirmed soon thereafter, as Fannie and Freddie 
began to report very large losses.  These losses meant that Fannie and Freddie did not 
have the capital to expand their role in the mortgage markets and that their political star 
began its fall once again. 
Because of their poor underwriting, the two companies started posting quarterly 
losses in 2007 that ran into the billions of dollars, with larger losses on the horizon.  As a 
result, they were having trouble complying with the capital requirements set by their 
regulator.  Their problems began to spiral out of the control along with those of the rest of 
the financial sector until then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson. Jr. asked that 
Congress give the Treasury the authority to take over the two companies if they were not 
able to meet their financial obligations.  Congress, with remarkable alacrity, passed the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 which granted that power to the Treasury.   
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Within days of the passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, Fannie 
and Freddie faced demands to raise more capital, pressures that they would not be able to 
meet.  Within a few weeks, the markets were expecting the federal government to bail out 
the two companies.  And within a couple of months, Paulson announced that he was 
placing the two companies in conservatorship because they were not able to raise the 
capital they needed to continue operating.  Throughout the credit crisis, their reported 
losses have only continued to increase. 
 
Fannie and Freddie Are Generating a Poor Return on the Nation’s Investment 
Fannie and Freddie have attempted to justify their existence by pointing to the 
benefits they provide to the American public, primarily: (1) offering systemic stability 
and liquidity to the market; (2) increasing the supply of affordable housing; (3) increasing 
consumer protection in the residential market; and (4) lowering the overall interest rate 
for homeowners.  
These claims have been contradicted to a great extent, however, by independent 
research as well as by recent events.  First, during the crisis Fannie and Freddie provided 
only limited stability and liquidity before full-scale government intervention was required 
to bail them out.   Second, while Fannie and Freddie typically do meet minimal 
affordable housing goals set forth by the government, a number of studies have indicated 
they hit their target by cannibalizing other federal programs and are not particularly 
effective in this regard when compared to other financial institutions.  Third, in the field 
of consumer protection, Fannie and Freddie’s reputation also took a blow when it became 
clear that, while refusing to directly securitize mortgages born of predatory lending, they 
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readily bought up suspect subprime and Alt A RMBS issued by other companies.  
Finally, Fannie and Freddie’s highly touted impact on the interest rate for homeowners 
amounts to a modest reduction for the typical borrower.  Considering the extraordinary 
profits received via Fannie and Freddie’s government-granted privileges, this is not an 
extraordinary benefit to the average homeowner, one that is measured in the tens of 
dollars a month.  This is particularly true when compared to the price tag for the taxpayer 
bailout of the two companies which is being measured in the hundreds of billions of 
dollars.  This has turned out to be a disastrous trade-off for the American public. 
Budgetary implications of the government’s guarantee provide an additional 
argument against Fannie and Freddie’s special relationship with the federal government.  
First, the cost of the government’s guarantee has been hidden because it has been off-
budget—if the government had to quantify and account for this contingent liability in the 
federal budget, it would trigger debt ceiling limits and materially reduce Congress’ ability 
to increase net spending.  Second, the cost of the guarantee is particularly difficult to 
quantify because it depends on the companies’ ever-changing exposure to mortgage 
obligations.  Finally, the cost of the guarantee is not capped by the federal government, 
given that the federal government has not imposed any meaningful limits on Fannie and 
Freddie’s growth. 
 
Conclusion 
The federal government’s special treatment of Fannie and Freddie is an 
extraordinary regulatory privilege in terms of its absolute value, its impact on its 
competitors and its cost to taxpayers.  The main problem with GSEs is well-documented:  
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they take on a life of their own and can survive well after they have achieved the 
purposes for which they are created.  GSEs should, as a general rule, be created with a 
sunset clause that would ensure that they would expire once they achieve their 
Congressionally-mandated goal.  Unfortunately, this is almost never done. 
The typical result of poor GSE design is that the GSE ends up driving much of the 
legislative and regulatory agenda regarding their own fates.  Fannie and Freddie reflect 
what is worst in GSE design.  After fulfilling their purpose of creating a national 
mortgage market, they have taken on monstrously large lives of their own.  With Fannie 
and Freddie, and our nation, at a crossroads, Congress should seize the opportunity to 
terminate their GSE privileges and convert them to fully private status.  Congress should 
also enact appropriate financial regulation, consumer protection legislation and affordable 
housing programs to fill the breach that a fully-privatized Fannie and Freddie would 
leave behind.  And Congress should remember the lessons of Fannie and Freddie when it 
considers using the GSE as a tool of government in the future. 
